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Abstract
This paper examines the current capacity of the EU’s airport infrastructure and the main factors
determining that capacity. The nature and role of airport services are detailed. The determination of
capacity is examined with discussion of the influence which air traffic control factors, demand
characteristics, environmental conditions and  engineering design  will have on capacity. The methods
used to assess delay are detailed along with extensive data  sketching the current state of Europe’s
system of large airports and the extent of infrastructure congestion. The options available to policy
makers to improve the management and organisation of capacity are set out and critically discussed.
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1 Introduction
An airport represents a multi-service networked industry with significant monopoly control in the
provision of many of its suite of services. In the first section of the paper, the nature of airport services
are examined, since the ‘bundling’ of services at airports is of particular significance in a European
context, particularly in relation to pricing/costing compared with the US.
The main aim of this paper is to examine the current capacity of the EU’s airport infrastructure and the
key factors determining that capacity. The increasing levels of congestion experienced in the 1990s,
particularly  at the largest airports, indicates that there is insufficient capacity. The nature and causes
of delays at airports are examined and the ways of alleviating or reducing delays are outlined. The
second section of the paper examines and reports on these factors. Data were gathered from a variety
of sources in order to present as comprehensive a view as possible of the current EU and ECAC air
traffic distribution patterns and delay and/or congestion distributions. These data are presented in this
section also.
Airport infrastructure capacity constraints is crucially important in determining the long term
development of the air transport sector. While the airline industry has been liberalised extensively
through the implementation of the ‘Third Package’ of measures (which came into effect between 1993
and 1997), control over the industry continues to be exercised indirectly or directly by governments
through their control of airport capacity allocation.  Airport pricing policy is of great significance in
affecting economically efficient allocations of existing capacity and in signalling where and whenPaper presented at 39
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expansion of capacity is necessary and justified.  The pricing policy will among other things influence
the average size of aircraft at airports, the relative importance and emphasis on short- versus medium-
or long-haul services and, the distribution of all EU traffic across the airports system. These factors in
turn have important implications for airline network structures - a key competitive tool for carriers in a
deregulated market. These issues are explored and discussed in third and fourth sections of the
paper.
In the final section of the paper the implications of these issues for interoperability in the EU’s
transport system are briefly outlined.
2 Assessing the capacity of airport infrastructure
2.I. The nature of Airport Services
2.1.1. Functions and ownership of civil airports:
The basic functions of an airport are to provide access for aircraft to the national airspace, to permit
easy interchange between aircraft and to facilitate the consolidation of traffic. In order to perform these
functions, the airport must have several basic infrastructure elements present1 such as runway,
taxiways, aprons (‘airside infrastructure’) and airport ground resources for passengers or cargo. The
ground resource elements as well as airside infrastructure capacity dictate the airport’s air traffic
capacity.
Traditionally, European and US airports have been in public ownership by local, regional or national
governments or some combination of government tiers. Approximately 160 airports received
scheduled international air services in the EU in 1991. This number has been expanding recently with
the growth in services to regional airports encouraged by air transport liberalisation. The largest EU
airports are owned by a combination of city, regional and national governments, with the exception of
the London airports, The London airports are privately owned and operated by BAA plc. In the US, the
airports that are used by scheduled air carriers are virtually all publicly owned facilities run by an
agency on behalf of the state or local government. There are a small number of publicly owned
airports which are managed and run by private companies who receive a management fee for their
services. No US airports have been privatised to date.
The EU has taken substantial steps towards liberalising the air transport sector, particularly with the
provisions in the so-called ‘Third Package’ of liberalisation measures. One of the cornerstones of
these regulations is that there be free entry to international markets, and since April 1997, domestic
markets for all EU registered carriers. As Hardaway (1991) noted, access to airport gates and
terminals is critical in permitting effective competition to take place and “Denial of access serves as an
absolute barrier to entry”. The constraints on existing airport capacity have been identified in several
studies as one of the main elements which will determine the extent to which competition actually
develops in the liberalised EU market (Balfour (1995), Comite des Sages (1994), Doganis (1995), AEA
(1996)).
                                                  
1In the US Document “Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges” [Federal Register: June 21, 1996 (Volume 61, Number
121)] [Notices], the following distinction between aeronautical and non aeronautical uses is made:  “The [US] Department [of
Transportation]  considers the aeronautical use of an airport to be  any activity that involves, makes possible, is required for the
safety  of, or is otherwise directly related to, the operation of aircraft.  Aeronautical use includes services provided by air carriers
related  directly and substantially to the movement of passengers, baggage, mail  and cargo on the airport. Persons, whether
individuals or businesses, engaged in aeronautical uses involving the operation of aircraft, or  providing flight support directly
related to the operation of aircraft,  are considered to be aeronautical users.    Conversely, the Department considers that the
operation by U.S. or  foreign air carriers of facilities such as a reservations center,  headquarters office, or flight kitchen on an
airport does not  constitute an aeronautical use......Such facilities need not be located on an airport. A carrier's decision to locate
such facilities is based on the  negotiation of a lease or sale of property. Accordingly, the Department  relies on the normal
forces of competition for non aeronautical  commercial or industrial property to assure that fees for such property  are not
excessive.”Paper presented at 39
th Congress of European Regional Science Association, August 24-27, 1999, University College Dublin,
Ireland
3
It can be argued that the larger European and US airports have a monopoly position in relation to
terminating or originating traffic (i.e. hinterland traffic) but face competition for connecting or
transferring traffics from other airports. In many large cities, there are two or more airports supporting
air transportation and thus competing for the hinterland traffic as well as transferring traffics. The
economic rationale for public ownership and operation is usually that some type of market failure
exists and government regulation or direct involvement is required. The main types of market failure
and other arguments for public ownership of airports  (adapted from Button (1993) and Kahn (1988))
are as follows:
￿ The containment of monopoly power
￿ The control of excessive competition
￿ The regulation of externalities
￿ The provision of public goods
￿ The provision of high costs infrastructure
￿ The integration of transport into wider economic policies
￿ The improvement in transport co-ordination
￿ The importance of the facility nationally
￿ The facilities may be natural monopolies
￿ Competition simply does not work well.
It can be argued that many of these factors continue to be relevant and substantive in relation to
continued public ownership and provision of airports. The key points of concern are (i) whether these
issues are relevant to all of the services provided at airports, or if it is the case that users would benefit
and efficiency would be improved if some airport services were competitively provided and (ii) for
services which remain in public ownership, what forms of economic regulation will optimise efficiency
and capital investment ?
Concerns in the US about privatisation have highlighted two main issues:
1. That privatised airports may not be able to fund long term maintenance and capacity expansion
programmes
2.  The issue of access (for certain carriers as well as for general aviation users) may be problematic
under a privatised system of operation, particularly if capacity constraints exist or are likely to exist in
the future.
An extensive study undertaken by the World Bank in 1995 (Juan, 1995) suggested that, on the basis
of relatively small scale private sector participation in airport ownership so far, the available data
indicates that both the quality of service and investment commitments have significantly improved.
This is the situation in which the private sector has a significant participation in management and
ownership. The effect of airport privatisation on airport pricing policies is difficult to measure, but the
following general patterns are noted:
(i) airside charges are not lower, nor have they increased substantially than under the previous
public ownership, but the charges pricing mechanisms have become more complex
(ii) airside charges are subject to price-cap economic regulation
(iii) there has been intense development of non-aeronautical commercial airport revenues at
relatively high prices. We note that non-aeronautical users of airport facilities have alternatives
in terms of locational choice and property fees2.
2.1.2. The nature and range of airport services
Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the categories of airport services typically found at
European and US airports. The services are grouped according to (a) whether the airport service is an
                                                  
2At present, there are few constraints on a private developer building car parks or hotels on lands adjacent to a large number of
European airports and competing with the airport authority in the provision of these services. If air-side capacity is required
however, constraints exist because of the airport authority’s ownership of most of the land tracts adjacent to the runways and
taxiways.Paper presented at 39
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‘aeronautical use’ or non-aeronautical use (b) whether there is general public access or access only
for those travelling by air (c) whether or not there is direct airside access. For airside facilities, it is
argued that duplication of runway, taxiway and apron facilities is not advisable for the following
reasons:
i) These infrastructural items require substantial capital investments and should generate fees
sufficient only to cover replacement costs.
ii) These facilities have significant planning requirements in terms of zoning of adjacent lands,
and surface transport access.
iii) These facilities have merit good characteristics and have non-economic potential benefits or
insurance aspects. For reasons of defence or growth and development, it may be necessary
to provide excess capacity or facilities of a higher technical standard than are actually required
to meet current demand with current technology.
Groundside facilities can be provided in a number of ways (a) through continued public ownership by a
single airport company (b) through franchised arrangements with public or private
management/operator companies (c) through mixed public/private ownership by multiple companies
(d) through privately  owned terminal companies, which have airside access (see Juan, (1995) for
lengthy discussion of these options).  From an economic standpoint, the main issue is whether
competition in the provision of these services is necessary, feasible and if it can be justified in terms of
keeping rates and costs low and producing a reasonable standard of service quality. While the costs
and benefits of each alternative approach need to be assessed for particular facilities, it is clear that
European airports offer an increasing range of services and facilities to their different customer
groups. Retail franchising and duty free sales for example are very lucrative areas for the airports and
have allowed for investment and expansion of the airports’ suite of services and facilities. The airports
have maintained a dominant or monopoly position for this suite of services and facilities. In many























Figure 1: Natures of Airport ServicesPaper presented at 39
th Congress of European Regional Science Association, August 24-27, 1999, University College Dublin,
Ireland
5
Many companies doing business at an airport pay both rental for the space which they occupy and a
gross receipts fee based on their turnover at the airport. In computing carrier fees, some airports may
take these concessionaire revenues fees into account. There are two methods used for the
computation of air carrier fees, the residual method and the compensatory method. With the former,
the airport deducts all revenue earned from non-airline sources from its total annual budget. The
airlines then pay the residual. With the latter approach, the airport is divided into various cost centres
and the airlines pay their fees based on the measures of airport services or facilities which they use
(for example, parking, terminals etc.) [ATAA, (1995)]. If competition is permitted in the provision of
terminal and groundside services, then this cross-subsidisation is unlikely to continue. With
competition in groundside services, revenues for infrastructure use can be collected either by billing
carriers separately for each service or by imposing collection requirements on a single agent.
The provision of basic airside infrastructure requires significant capital investment as well as having
substantial planning requirements. In addition, the merit good characteristics and insurance aspects
provide strong argument for continued public sector ownership and involvement. However in relation
to the other types of airport services, a wide range of possibilities exist for raising the level of private
sector involvement and imposing competitive or efficiency conditions on the production of services.
The World Bank report (Juan, 1995) gives examples of a variety of circumstances and contexts.
Generally speaking, the US airports offer a narrower range of services and facilities to airlines and
passengers and have exercised greater flexibility in permitting private sector development and use of
publicly owned airport lands.
2.2.  Airport Infrastructure and the determinants of Airport Capacity
2.2.1. Defining airport capacity
Airport capacity analyses serves two main functions: (a) to objectively measure the capabilities of the
components of the airport system to handle forecast aircraft movements and passenger flows and (b)
to estimate the extent of delays in the system as demand varies (Ashford and Wright, 1992).
‘Capacity’ refers to the ability of a component in the airport system to handle aircraft and is usually
expressed in terms of operations per hour (arrivals or departures).  This hourly capacity is the
maximum number of operations that can be handled in a one hour period under specific operating
conditions, most notably
w Ceiling and visibility
w Air traffic control
w Aircraft mix
w Nature of operations
Capacity is therefore a measure of supply. In order to determine the capacity, the operating conditions
must be specified.
The preferred measure of capacity is the ‘ultimate or saturation’ capacity which gives the maximum
number of aircraft that can be handled during a certain period under conditions of continuous demand
(Ashford and Wright, 1992). Runway capacity is usually the controlling element of the airport’s system
capacity and will be the main focus of discussions in this section of the paper. The main factors
influencing runway capacity are
w Air Traffic Control
w Demand Characteristics
w Environmental Conditions
w Design and Layout of the Runway System
We will examine each of these factors in some detail.Paper presented at 39




EUROCONTROL specifies minimum vertical, horizontal and lateral separations of aircraft in the
interests of safety. These minima in turn depend on
¤ Aircraft size
¤ Availability of radar
¤ Sequencing of Operations
¤ Runway Occupancy Time
Capacity can be significantly increased by inserting departures between pairs of arrivals, since the
minimum separations of both operations limit the total hourly capacity of a runway (Ashford and
Wright, 1992). Arrivals on final approach are typically given absolute priority over departures where
the latter are permitted when suitable gaps occur in the flow of arrivals.
Separation minima are the dominant ATC factor affecting capacity. Other ATC factors include
w Length of the common path from ILS (Instrument Landing System) gate to the threshold
w Sequencing strategy used by controllers for aircraft travelling at different speeds (e.g. first come
first served versus speed-class sequencing)
w Probability of violation of the separation rules
w Technology and the degree of sophistication of the ATC system
Demand Characteristics
The runway capacity will depend on aircraft size, speed, manoeuvrability and braking capability as
well as human factors such as pilot skills. Aircraft size impacts on (a) approach and touchdown speeds
(b) wing-tip vortices. Slower speeds reduce the runway capacity; the generation of wing-tip vortices by
larger aircraft creates maneuverability problems for smaller aircraft and therefore requires greater
separation between larger and smaller aircraft for reasons of safety. Quite often, practical separations
are longer than the regulated minima in order to allow for a mix of fast and slow, large and small
aircraft.
The runway occupancy time required by arriving aircraft will vary depending on speed, braking
capability and ground maneuverability. This will influence the availability of suitable slots for departing
aircraft. Furthermore the mix of arrival and departure operations will affect the runway capacity.
Environmental Factors
Visibility, runway surface conditions, winds and noise abatement requirements are the most
important environmental factors influencing runway capacity (Ashford and Wright, 1992). As
visibility conditions worsen, longer separations are required for reasons of safety. When
visibility falls below certain thresholds, instrument flight rules (IFR) are required which passes
control of spacing to the air traffic controller from the pilot. Wet or slippery conditions may
force longer runway occupancy times as braking for example may take longer. Crosswinds or
tail winds may require the imposition of restrictions on the use of multiple runways. Noise
abatement regulations affect capacity by limiting or restricting the use of one or more runways
at particular times of the day.
Design Factors
Airport layout and design of the runway and taxiway system are important influences on the runway
capacity. The key factors  which must be taken into account in this category arePaper presented at 39
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¤ The number, spacing, length and orientation of the runways
¤ The number, locations and design of exit taxiways
¤ The design of ramp entrances.
The relationship between each of these factors and runway capacity is discussed in detail in Ashford
and Wright (1992).
2.2.2. Measuring capacity and delays
The two main sources of data used in this paper for the analysis of European airport delays and
indications of congestion come from (i) the Association of European Airlines (AEA) and (ii) The Centre
for Delay Analysis (CODA) at EUROCONTROL (the European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation). The data collected and reported by both of these agencies are described and outlined
below. A brief summary of the main trends reported in the CODA and AEA reports for the most recent
period is then presented. The implications for the long term development of EU air transport are
outlined in the next section.
(i) AEA monitoring of airline punctuality
The AEA has conducted a survey among its members at a sample (19) of the larger EU airports since
1986, aimed at monitoring on a monthly basis the extent and reasons for delays on intra-European
departures. The data are obtained from between 10 and 13 reporting airlines. The AEA use IATA’s
standard delay codes and categories in collating their results and annually present two summary
figures in their Yearbook. Further details on the survey were sought from the AEA but were not
forthcoming. The AEA report that these data are highly sensitive commercially and confidentiality
clauses constrain them from making more information publicly available. IATA detail very precisely the
situations giving rise to delays in airline departures and conduct their own survey among 16 airlines
annually. Their analysis is discussed below in conjunction with the EUROCONTROL data. The
standard delay codes used by both IATA and the AEA are included in Appendix 1 and fall into 11 main
categories. These are:
￿ Internal airline problems or schedule discrepancies
￿ Passenger and baggage
￿ Cargo and mail
￿ Aircraft and ramp handling
￿ Technical and aircraft equipment
￿ Damage to aircraft and EDP automated equipment failure
￿ Flight operations and crewing
￿ Weather
￿ Airport and government authorities (including air traffic control)
￿ Reactionary
￿ Miscellaneous (e.g. industrial action)
Departure delays in the AEA and IATA surveys are based on real recorded delays compared with the
CODA measure of delay which is based on the difference between the scheduled off block time and
the calculated off block time, taking into account slot time and estimated taxi time.
The AEA survey showed relatively high levels of delay in the late 1980s, with improvements generally
in the early 1990s, up until 1994. Since summer of 1994, there has been a gradual rise in departure
delays as measured by the percentage of flights delayed by 15 minutes or more. Figure 2 is taken
from the most recent AEA report and shows the Percentage of European Departure Delays by the
Main Reason for the Delay.  In 1997, there was a 4% increase in average delay per aircraft movement
for all reasons compared with 1996. In 1997, 54% of all flights were delayed for any of the above
causes, compared with 59% of all flights in 1996; the average delay per movement was 11 minutes in
1997.Paper presented at 39
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The graph indicates that the majority of delays were related to airport and air traffic control difficulties,
which accounted for roughly 60% of all delays in 1995 & 1996. Figure 2 shows the monthly trend in
European departure delays. For 1996, it can be noted that the distribution of delays shows a less
obvious seasonal pattern than in previous years (there was a more significant seasonal pattern in
1995).
In 1996, air traffic flow management over Europe was centralised within Eurocontrol, which the AEA
report resulted in a wider distribution of delay. This helped to alleviate delays in the worst affected
sectors but introduced delays in sectors, which had previously operated, with minimal delay. The
European air traffic control system remains fragmented with 49 European ATC centres, 31 national
systems, 18 hardware suppliers, 22 operating systems and 30 programming languages under the
ECAC organisational umbrella (AEA, Yearbook 1997).
Figure 2: European Departure Delays by Main Reason
                  (Source: Association of European Airlines Yearbook, 1997)
Figure 3: Monthly European Departure Delays, 1993-97
                  (Source: Association of European Airlines Yearbook, 1997)Paper presented at 39
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In monitoring the charges for ATC services, the AEA demonstrate that both enroute charges and
ground handling charges are the two main infrastructure costs which have increased most significantly
on European routes since the implementation of the Third Package in January 1993. On average,
landing charges have remained unchanged since 1993  with ground handling increasing by 6.2% and
enroute charges increasing by 6.4% between 1993 and 1995. These costs vary significantly across
the ECAC states as demonstrated in Figure 4 which shows the enroute costs in US dollars to overfly
European states for a standard aircraft type and distance of 850kms.
Figure 4: Costs to Overfly Europe in 1997
                  Source: Association of European Airlines Yearbook, 1997 and Eurocontrol
Aircraft and passenger handling delays have increased in significance in the most recent period,
reflecting internal airline procedures as well as airport ground facilities and terminal conditions.
(ii) EUROCONTROL Centre for Delay Analysis (CODA)  analysis of delays in European air
transport.
In 1997, the Centre for Delay Analysis at EUROCONTROL began producing monthly delay reports
using data collated from several sources, the main three being (a) AEA data (b) Air Traffic Flow
Management data reported by the Central Flow Management Units within EUROCONTROL and (c)
data supplied by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which is based on 16 reporting
airlines. The Centre produces its own ‘CODA Delay Indicator’, which gives an overview of the overall
delay experience. The CODA analysis provided much more detailed breakdowns of the causes of
delays and gives route specific analysis of average delays in minutes based on CFMU data. The main
trends reported in the most recent CODA reports are outlined below and pertain to 1996 and 1997.
First quarter results for 1998 were also available and have been included where relevant. The data
obtained from the AEA are presented in CODA reports in far more detail than they appear in the
AEA’s own Yearbook publication, but are only available since the beginning of 1997.
ECAC traffic grew by 6% in 1997 over 1996 traffic levels. Despite this growth, CODA claim that the
amount of delay caused by the imposition of air traffic flow management measures of the CFMUs has
remained relatively unchanged since 1996. The number of flights delayed by more than 15 minutes
decreased between 1996 and 1997, with longer delays of greater than 30 minutes decreasing by 15%
between 1996 and 1997, amongst flights subject to ATFM restrictions. The ATFM restrictions were put
in place to protect congested airports, which faced problems associated with lack of capacity, parking
difficulties, low visibility procedures etc. Airports particularly affected by these restrictions include
London Heathrow, Athens, Barcelona, Milan and Amsterdam (CODA, 1998).  The CODA reportPaper presented at 39
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presents data for ECAC airports with more than 30,000 movements (departures and arrivals
separately) annually and gives the following statistics for each of these airports:
￿ Total number of flights
￿ Total number of delayed flights
￿ Total delay in minutes
￿ Number of flights delayed 60 minutes or more
￿ Average delay per delayed flight
￿ Average delay per movement
These data are presented in full in Appendix 2. Summary statistics for 10 worst departure and ten
worst destination airports are presented in Table 1. The departure airports with the worst average
delay per movement in 1997 were Athens, Madrid, Palma, Nice, Dusseldorf and Geneva. For all of
these airports more than 25% of flights were delayed and the average delay per movement exceeded
4.9 minutes. For the ECAC area as a whole, the percentage of delayed flights was 15% in 1997, with
an average delay per movement of 2.9 minutes.
The destination or arrival airports with the worst average delay per movement were Athens,
Milan/Linate, Barcelona, Madrid/Barajas, London/Heathrow and Paris/Charles de Gaulle.  A significant
proportion of the delays at these airports was due to ATFM restrictions at Milan, Barcelona, Madrid
and London Heathrow airports.
The data were combined with the Airports Council International (ACI) traffic data and correlations with
growth rates are also presented. The ACI data cover the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 and give
breakdowns of traffic for 38 European countries, 341 European cities and 359 European cities in 1997.
Traffic statistics cover aircraft movements (distinguished by passenger, combination and all-cargo air
transport aircraft as well as detailing general aviation movements), passenger volumes (distinguished
by domestic and international terminal passengers and transit passengers) and cargo (differentiated
by domestic and international  cargo, and by mail and all other freight). Tables 2 and 3 present recent
traffic statistics for the busiest city in each European state, for the period 1995-1997. This is in line
with US analysis by the FAA using its ‘hub’ classification (DOT/FAA, 1996), which analyses air traffic
patterns for cities or metropolitan areas as single entities. Of the 341 European cities examined, 8 are
served by two airports, 3 by three airports and London is served by five airports.
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate the international nature of European traffic; Moscow, Stockholm, Madrid
and Rome are distinctive by their high share of domestic traffic (less than 60% of total traffic is
international). The percentage of transit traffic is generally quite low. The tables give two measures of
average passenger per aircraft movement: the correct comparison uses average passengers per air
transport movement rather than per total movements (which includes general aviation), but in many
instances data on air transport movements alone were not available. The main trend noted in the table
is the significantly lower number of passengers per movement in the former Soviet Union/Eastern
European states.
Average passengers per movement are highest at the main hub in the UK, Germany, France and Italy,
which tend to have the most congested airports. Rates are also high in the Southern European
tourism oriented cities of Larnaca (Cyprus), Malta, Madrid and Istanbul. We note that growth rates in
passenger volumes has generally been higher than growth rates in aircraft movements. The highest
growth rates have been experienced in the former Soviet Union/Eastern European states. Significant
declines in traffic were also most significant among these states. More modest growth rates are
recorded for Paris, Frankfurt and Athens.
Tables 4 and 5 present recent traffic statistics for the top 40 European passenger airports in 1997.
London (Heathrow and Gatwick), Frankfurt, Paris (Charles de Gaulle and Orly) and Amsterdam were
the six busiest airports in greater Europe in 1997, with the top 4 dominating in both passenger
throughput and aircraft movements. Over 80% of passenger traffic is international for these four
airports, while for the group ranked from sixth to eighth serve as important domestic airports (i.e.
Paris/Orly, Rome/Fiumicino and Madrid/Barajas). The busier airports generally tend to have higher
average passenger numbers per movement. London’s Heathrow and Gatwick airports havePaper presented at 39
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substantially higher rates again compared with the other top ranked airports. Heathrow’s rate has
increased significantly in the last two years reflecting the constraints, which this facility faces.
The ACI data and the CODA data were combined in order to compute correlations between traffic and
delay characteristics. The correlations computed are recorded in Table 6. The table highlights the fact
that traffic levels have the greatest association with overall delay (i.e. departure plus arrival delays);
the R-squared between traffic level and delay is 0.82. There is no statistical association between traffic
growth rates and average delay per movement. The correlation between total delay and average
passenger/movement is 0.37. So the congested airports which experience the greatest delays can
allow increases in their passenger throughput by encouraging the utilisation of larger aircraft.
Table 1
Summary Statistics For 10 Worst Departure And Ten Worst Destination Airports
Most Penalised Destination Airports (with more than 30,000 flights )























Athens 67790 19336 28.52 561808 1566 29.06 8.29
Milan/Linate 91829 32857 35.78 655815 841 19.96 7.14
Barcelona 107139 33608 31.37 680490 745 20.25 6.35
Madrid/Barajas 131659 45197 34.33 791670 837 17.52 6.01
London/Heathrow 218132 65221 29.9 1308785 2459 20.07 6
Paris/Charles-De-Gaulle 200538 53899 26.88 1100202 1554 20.41 5.49
Paris/Orly 122318 33996 27.79 615610 676 18.11 5.03
New York 30418 7830 25.74 151412 123 19.34 4.98
Nice 63932 15017 23.49 296555 274 19.75 4.64
Tenerife Sur/Reina Sofia 27055 5987 22.13 120140 88 20.07 4.44
Most Penalised Departure Airports (with more than 30,000 flights )






















Athens 68102 27064 39.74 802053 2333 29.64 11.78
Madrid/Barajas 132350 43493 32.86 897386 1500 20.63 6.78
Palma De Mallorca 74123 18758 25.31 391171 378 20.85 5.28
Nice 64014 16276 25.43 316151 325 19.42 4.94
Dusseldorf 91386 25778 28.21 448948 315 17.42 4.91
Geneva 62592 15846 25.32 294571 357 18.59 4.71
Lyon/Sartolas 50394 12164 24.14 226206 244 18.6 4.49
Marseille/Provence 46751 10854 23.22 207165 220 19.09 4.43
Barcelona 106866 23460 21.951 471672 673 20.11 4.41
Brussels 134942 33831 25.07 590159 497 17.44 4.37
CODA also present detailed data on average delays per movement for routes/city pairs with 3,000 or
more flights per annum. These data are reproduced in Appendix 2. City pairs with either London or
Paris as the destination airport dominate the list of the worst affected routes. These cities are critically
important hubs in the European air traffic system as Table 7 demonstrates. These data from Eurostat
show the volumes of air traffic between EU countries in 1994 and the dominance of London and Paris
can be appreciated.Paper presented at 39










1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
AUSTRIA VIENNA 1 143236 154272 155933 8546233 9140643 9738292
BELGIUM BRUSSELS 1 221765 241518 254720 12600617 13520869 15935226
BULGARIA SOFIA 1 23742 22890 22266 1212740 1095762 1084900
CROATIA ZAGREB 1 21338 23840 25312 902925 1008646 1080697
CYPRUS LARNACA 1 34752 34399 35304 3777177 3648399 3797236
CZECH
REPUBLIC
PRAGUE 1 68623 73824 77334 3211460 3798859 4359962
DENMARK COPENHAGEN 1 237371 265805 279312 14678879 15860778 16837116
ESTONIA TALLINN 1 11381 13781 17246 366919 431929 503427
FINLAND HELSINKI 2 113154 121538 136462 7140849 7689316 8471288
FRANCE PARIS 2 558058 605931 632561 55009348 59089020 60349696
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
1 372587 380012 387510 38179544 38761176 40262692
GREECE ATHENS 1 121785 123003 139741 10480786 10411690 11090035
HUNGARY BUDAPEST 1 44760 50702 55065 2909330 3314020 3619074
IRELAND DUBLIN 1 110568 121673 134325 8024894 9091296 10333202
ITALY ROME 2 219550 248383 259118 21857748 23815110 25845492
LATVIA RIGA 1 14342 14958 15395 504094 505754 535235
LITHUANIA VILNIUS 1 9656 9968 11339 355638 370537 410879
LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 1 36555 37628 40329 1235580 1262576 1413145
MACEDONIA SKOPJE 1 9768 6918 7278 583053 422598 440988
MALTA MALTA 1 27321 26766 27742 2589010 2518528 2704638
MONACO MONACO 1 109209 117776 131038
NETHERLANDS AMSTERDAM 1 290689 321779 349476 25355008 27794872 31569976
NORWAY OSLO 2 152389 10552803
POLAND WARSAW 1 44530 50282 55597 2735469 3090321 3547143
PORTUGAL LISBON 1 69868 73148 76780 6476564 6580115 6817050
ROMANIA BUCHAREST 2 38816 24122 26660 2089839 1468989 1470659
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
MOSCOW 3 69957 182510 198930 4362372 12922999 14355797
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
BRATISLAVA 1 8412 8929 8879 213774 273083 300766
SLOVENIA LJUBLJANA 1 17600 17939 14723 638268 668532 713696
SPAIN MADRID 2 219318 242955 252669 19956511 21856931 23601989
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 2 231847 245349 267421 14362412 15052551 16111129
SWITZERLAND ZURICH 1 209034 224432 241465 15340449 16226041 18268522
TURKEY ISTANBUL 1 131579 148930 158337 12074379 13506137 14801819
UKRAINE KIEV 1 30728 28656 30660 1307699 1280310 1375337
UNITED
KINGDOM
LONDON 5 716953 772042 815428 83304550 88401218 94934438
YUGOSLAVIA BELGRADE 1 16636 18048 20658 976476 1191247 1379567
Average 132819 141055 149485 10945072 11560795 12449782
Source: Airports Council International, Geneva, 1998
Note: Blanks indicate data not availablePaper presented at 39




Recent Traffic Statistics for Busiest City in Each European State
Country City No.
Airports
Total Freight Percentage Int'l Pax Percentage
Transit Pax
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 1995 1997
AUSTRIA VIENNA 1 98588 101620 113734 93.76 93.80 94.60 2.04 1.46
BELGIUM BRUSSELS 1 441262 464036 530718 99.22 98.79 99.24 0.77 0.74
BULGARIA SOFIA 1 11650 10795 10498 91.94 92.31 92.66 0.00 0.04
CROATIA ZAGREB 1 8183 7575 7331 62.35 65.84 65.56 0.53 1.07
CYPRUS LARNACA 1 29506 28666 29321 95.51 95.69 96.74 4.49 3.26
CZECH
REPUBLIC
PRAGUE 1 30304 19941 24603 97.42 95.77 92.14 1.37 6.47
DENMARK COPENHAGEN 1 337965 387699 79.24 80.05 82.23 2.43 1.37
ESTONIA TALLINN 1 2488 3997 5590 99.20 98.98 98.81 0.00 0.19
FINLAND HELSINKI 2 91314 97218 99236 65.33 65.16 63.63 8.70 9.36
FRANCE PARIS 2 1220255 1241346 1309404 66.49 66.44 67.95 0.79 0.37
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
1 1461284 1497245 1514267 79.25 80.02 80.52 1.84 1.44
GREECE ATHENS 1 104111 84340 119927 63.92 63.66 61.55 2.26 0.00
HUNGARY BUDAPEST 1 23221 23354 27175 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
IRELAND DUBLIN 1 66607 74150 92000 94.07 94.11 94.32 0.52 0.95
ITALY ROME 2 298457 308179 298443 57.39 55.31 54.54 1.88 1.48
LATVIA RIGA 1 3918 3912 4281 97.32 98.23 99.23 2.68 0.75
LITHUANIA VILNIUS 1 9253 6724 5845 100.00 99.91 99.80 0.00 0.09
LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 1 286965 281183 340331 97.92 99.16 99.28 2.08 0.72
MACEDONIA SKOPJE 1 9922 2951 4868 99.63 99.31 97.76 0.32 2.24
MALTA MALTA 1 11613 11468 98.15 97.02 96.79 1.85 3.21
MONACO MONACO 1
NETHERLANDS AMSTERDAM 1 1019315 1124652 1207282 97.45 97.46 97.66 1.97 1.74
NORWAY OSLO 2 71722 0.70
POLAND WARSAW 1 34899 41047 51028 88.98 88.03 88.44
PORTUGAL LISBON 1 99231 100725 110631 77.07 77.58 78.16 3.60 2.72
ROMANIA BUCHAREST 2 31650 19699 13414 70.23 95.60 96.11 5.25 3.84
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
MOSCOW 3 27521 120973 131136 6.92 60.62 58.77 0.59 1.27
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
BRATISLAVA 1 2809 3121 2210 79.89 84.74 87.54 12.68 4.92
SLOVENIA LJUBLJANA 1 6418 5042 5898 99.95 99.81 98.62 0.00 1.29
SPAIN MADRID 2 253637 267703 282410 47.63 46.77 46.68 1.43 2.03
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 2 130143 145004 146083 53.77 55.48 57.31 1.75 1.52
SWITZERLAND ZURICH 1 344044 340091 355301 91.00 91.14 91.67 2.75 2.18
TURKEY ISTANBUL 1 139281 140313 178714 67.26 68.53 66.40 1.24 1.31
UKRAINE KIEV 1 16492 17105 12417 64.54 67.86 94.01 0.72 1.08
UNITED
KINGDOM
LONDON 5 1488200 1570657 1713883 87.29 86.78 87.13 0.67 0.60
YUGOSLAVIA BELGRADE 1 5214 6757 8164 67.02 76.22 74.82 0.00 0.00
Average 231749 243130 268936 76.03 78.78 79.46 1.89 1.66
Source: Airports Council International, Geneva, 1998
Note: Blanks indicate data not availablePaper presented at 39




Selected Statistics for Busiest City in Each European State
Country City Avg Pax per Pax/Combi
Movement
Avg Pax per Total Movements
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
AUSTRIA VIENNA 60.60 60.12 63.76 59.67 59.25 62.45
BELGIUM BRUSSELS 62.66 61.79 69.75 56.82 55.98 62.56
BULGARIA SOFIA 54.36 51.21 52.52 51.08 47.87 48.72
CROATIA ZAGREB 42.32 42.31 42.70 42.32 42.31 42.70
CYPRUS LARNACA 109.50 107.70 108.69 106.06 107.56
CZECH
REPUBLIC
PRAGUE 46.80 51.46 56.38
DENMARK COPENHAGEN 65.52 62.97 63.66 61.84 59.67 60.28
ESTONIA TALLINN 32.36 31.50 32.42 32.24 31.34 29.19
FINLAND HELSINKI 63.11 63.27 62.08
FRANCE PARIS 103.24 102.11 100.36 98.57 97.52 95.41
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
108.32 102.47 102.00 103.90
GREECE ATHENS 86.06 84.65 79.36
HUNGARY BUDAPEST 65.00 65.36 65.72
IRELAND DUBLIN 79.79 72.58 74.72 76.93
ITALY ROME 105.06 99.56 95.88 99.74
LATVIA RIGA 35.25 33.88 34.78 35.15 33.81 34.77
LITHUANIA VILNIUS 38.85 38.44 36.66 36.83 37.17 36.24
LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 39.90 39.26 41.68 33.80 33.55 35.04
MACEDONIA SKOPJE 64.48 63.01 61.61 59.69 61.09 60.59
MALTA MALTA 97.17 95.38 99.21 94.76 94.09 97.49
MONACO MONACO
NETHERLANDS AMSTERDAM 90.80 90.00 93.83 87.22 86.38 90.34
NORWAY OSLO 71.83 69.25
POLAND WARSAW 61.43 61.46 63.80 61.43 61.46 63.80
PORTUGAL LISBON 94.20 90.88 89.59 92.70 89.96 88.79
ROMANIA BUCHAREST 53.84 60.90 55.16
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
MOSCOW 65.66 72.08 78.28 62.36 70.81 72.17
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
BRATISLAVA 31.09 25.41 30.58 33.87
SLOVENIA LJUBLJANA 38.22 39.86 54.39 36.27 37.27 48.47
SPAIN MADRID 90.99 89.96 93.41
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 63.68 63.70 62.12 61.95 61.35 60.25
SWITZERLAND ZURICH 73.45 72.33 75.68 73.39 72.30 75.66
TURKEY ISTANBUL 91.77 90.69 93.48
UKRAINE KIEV 44.24 47.25 47.11 42.56 44.68 44.86
UNITED
KINGDOM
LONDON 123.10 117.94 119.87 116.19 114.50 116.42
YUGOSLAVIA BELGRADE 59.97 66.60 66.98 58.70 66.00 66.78
Average 53.25 39.00 43.29 64.75 63.16 64.46
Source: Airports Council International, Geneva, 1998
Note: Blanks indicate data not availablePaper presented at 39




Selected Statistics for Busiest City in Each European State
Country City Traffic Growth - Pax Traffic Growth - Movements
1995/96 1996/97 1995/97 1995/96 1996/97 1995/97
AUSTRIA VIENNA 6.96 6.54 13.95 7.70 1.08 8.86
BELGIUM BRUSSELS 7.30 17.86 26.46 8.91 5.47 14.86
BULGARIA SOFIA -9.65 -0.99 -10.54 -3.59 -2.73 -6.22
CROATIA ZAGREB 11.71 7.14 19.69 11.73 6.17 18.62
CYPRUS LARNACA -3.41 4.08 0.53 -1.02 2.63 1.59
CZECH
REPUBLIC
PRAGUE 18.29 14.77 35.76 7.58 4.75 12.69
DENMARK COPENHAGEN 8.05 6.16 14.70 11.98 5.08 17.67
ESTONIA TALLINN 17.72 16.55 37.20 21.09 25.14 51.53
FINLAND HELSINKI 7.68 10.17 18.63 7.41 12.28 20.60
FRANCE PARIS 7.42 2.13 9.71 8.58 4.39 13.35
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
1.52 3.87 5.46 1.99 1.97 4.01
GREECE ATHENS -0.65 6.52 5.81 1.00 13.61 14.74
HUNGARY BUDAPEST 13.91 9.20 24.40 13.28 8.61 23.02
IRELAND DUBLIN 13.29 13.66 28.76 10.04 10.40 21.49
ITALY ROME 8.96 8.53 18.24 13.13 4.32 18.02
LATVIA RIGA 0.32 5.83 6.18 4.30 2.92 7.34
LITHUANIA VILNIUS 4.19 10.89 15.53 3.23 13.75 17.43
LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 2.18 11.93 14.37 2.94 7.18 10.32
MACEDONIA SKOPJE -27.52 4.35 -24.37 -29.18 5.20 -25.49
MALTA MALTA -2.72 7.39 4.47 -2.03 3.65 1.54
MONACO MONACO 7.84 11.26 19.99
NETHERLANDS AMSTERDAM 9.62 13.58 24.51 10.70 8.61 20.22
NORWAY OSLO
POLAND WARSAW 12.97 14.78 29.67 12.92 10.57 24.85
PORTUGAL LISBON 1.60 3.60 5.26 4.69 4.97 9.89
ROMANIA BUCHAREST -29.71 0.11 -29.63 -37.86 10.52 -31.32
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
MOSCOW 196.24 11.09 229.08 160.89 9.00 184.36
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
BRATISLAVA 27.74 10.14 40.69 6.15 -0.56 5.55
SLOVENIA LJUBLJANA 4.74 6.76 11.82 1.93 -17.93 -16.35
SPAIN MADRID 9.52 7.98 18.27 10.78 4.00 15.21
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 4.81 7.03 12.18 5.82 9.00 15.34
SWITZERLAND ZURICH 5.77 12.59 19.09 7.37 7.59 15.51
TURKEY ISTANBUL 11.86 9.59 22.59 13.19 6.32 20.34
UKRAINE KIEV -2.09 7.42 5.17 -6.74 6.99 -0.22
UNITED
KINGDOM
LONDON 6.12 7.39 13.96 7.68 5.62 13.74
YUGOSLAVIA BELGRADE 21.99 15.81 41.28 8.49 14.46 24.18
Average 10.40 8.49 20.25 8.47 5.97 15.20
Source: Airports Council International, Geneva, 1998
Note: Blanks indicate data not availablePaper presented at 39























1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
1 1 UK LONDON HEATHROW LHR 418.8 426.9 429.2 54452.6 56037.8 58142.8
3 2 GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
RHEIM/MAIN FRA 372.6 380.0 387.5 38179.5 38761.2 40262.7
2 3 FRANCE PARIS CHARLES DE
GAULLE
CDG 325.3 360.6 395.5 28355.5 31724.0 35293.4
4 4 NETH. AMSTERDAM SCHIPHOL AMS 290.7 321.8 349.5 25355.0 27794.9 31570.0
13 5 UK LONDON GATWICK LGW 192.0 211.0 229.3 22549.3 24337.4 26961.5
12 6 FRANCE PARIS ORLY ORY 232.7 245.4 237.1 26653.9 27365.0 25056.3
11 7 ITALY ROME FIUMICINO FCO 209.2 236.5 245.7 21091.4 23035.8 25001.0
9 8 SPAIN MADRID BARAJAS MAD 219.0 242.8 252.4 19956.1 21856.7 23601.7
7 9 SWITZ. ZURICH ZURICH ZRH 209.0 224.4 241.5 15340.4 16226.0 18268.5
8 10 GERMANY MUNICH MUNICH MUC 201.9 211.7 246.4 14867.9 15686.1 17894.7
5 11 DENMARK COPENHAGEN COPENHAGEN CPH 237.4 265.8 279.3 14678.9 15860.8 16837.1




PMI 119.9 127.3 142.8 14728.1 15377.4 16557.6
20 13 UK MANCHESTER MANCHESTER MAN 148.9 143.7 148.5 14982.7 14670.4 15950.6
6 14 BELGIUM BRUSSELS BRUSSELS
NATIONAL
BRU 221.8 241.5 254.7 12600.6 13520.9 15935.2
18 15 GERMANY DUSSELDORF DUSSELDORF DUS 166.5 161.7 168.8 15146.5 14422.1 15532.1
10 16 SWEDEN STOCKHOLM ARLANDA ARN 215.7 227.9 246.2 13540.4 14221.7 15197.7
14 17 SPAIN BARCELONA BARCELONA BCN 152.8 177.7 208.0 11727.6 13434.7 15065.7
16 18 TURKEY ISTANBUL ATATURK IST 131.6 148.9 158.3 12074.4 13506.1 14801.8
17 19 ITALY MILAN LINATE LIN 132.6 156.9 165.7 10827.1 12563.4 14271.1
27 20 GREECE ATHENS ATHINAI ATH 121.8 123.0 139.7 10480.8 10411.7 11090.0
22 21 IRELAND DUBLIN DUBLIN DUB 110.6 121.7 134.3 8024.9 9091.3 10333.2
19 22 AUSTRIA VIENNA VIENNA INTL VIE 143.2 154.3 155.9 8546.2 9140.6 9738.3
31 23 RUSSIAN
FED.
MOSCOW SHERMETYEVO SVO 116.3 117.6 8572.5 9384.1
29 24 GERMANY BERLIN TEGEL TXL 112.5 117.2 117.5 8271.8 8374.0 8731.6
21 25 GERMANY HAMBURG HAMBURG-
F HLSBUTTEL
HAM 118.6 119.9 124.7 8201.5 8194.9 8648.8
25 26 FINLAND HELSINKI HELSINKI
VANTAA
HEL 113.0 121.5 136.4 7140.7 7689.2 8471.2




LPA 76.8 76.3 78.9 7877.3 7890.7 8160.5




TFS 52.1 51.8 52.8 7398.5 7293.8 7580.8
15 29 FRANCE NICE NICE-COTE
D'AZUR
NCE 122.6 141.5 173.7 6142.9 6604.0 7373.0
56 30 SPAIN MALAGA MALAGA AGP 55.7 59.5 65.1 6311.5 6652.6 7270.2
28 31 GERMANY STUTTGART STUTTGART STR 85.3 96.2 95.3 5158.5 6515.2 6910.3
46 32 PORTUGAL LISBON LISBON LIS 69.9 73.1 76.8 6476.6 6580.1 6817.1
86 33 TURKEY ANTALYA ANTALYA AYT 39.8 44.9 49.0 4727.7 5592.9 6687.6
23 34 SWITZ. GENEVA AEROPORT
INTL DE
GENEVE
GVA 99.2 102.1 100.6 6207.8 6118.3 6117.8
40 35 UK GLASGOW GLASGOW GLA 74.9 75.6 80.1 5528.6 5591.9 6115.8
37 36 UK BIRMINGHAM BIRMINGHAM
INTL
BHX 75.0 77.4 80.5 5333.4 5472.0 6030.2
30 37 FRANCE MARSEILLE MARSEILLE
PROVENCE
MRS 72.4 79.4 86.9 5106.6 5401.4 5473.6
35 38 UK LONDON STANSTED STN 66.1 77.5 84.4 3920.3 4865.1 5426.7
24 39 GERMANY COLOGNE COLOGNE
BONN
CGN 111.4 120.2 136.2 4740.1 5227.0 5308.7
38 40 FRANCE LYON SATOLAS LYS 75.5 85.3 94.1 4432.6 4967.1 4944.5Paper presented at 39













Percentage Int'l Pax Percentage
Transit Pax
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 1995 1997
1 UK HEATHROW LHR 1125.6 1140.8 1260.1 85.96 86.12 86.96 0.63 0.57
2 GERMANY RHEIM/MAIN FRA 1461.3 1497.2 1514.3 79.25 80.02 80.52 1.84 1.44
3 FRANCE CHARLES DE
GAULLE
CDG 929.0 979.0 1072.2 90.05 90.36 89.39 1.27 0.54
4 NETH. SCHIPHOL AMS 1019.3 1124.7 1207.3 97.45 97.46 97.66 1.97 1.74
5 UK GATWICK LGW 245.9 294.0 287.4 91.36 90.52 90.44 0.73 0.61
6 FRANCE ORLY ORY 291.2 262.3 237.2 41.43 38.70 37.74 0.28 0.13
7 ITALY FIUMICINO FCO 291.3 300.1 288.2 56.11 54.15 53.25 1.82 1.47
8 SPAIN BARAJAS MAD 253.6 267.7 282.4 47.63 46.77 46.68 1.43 2.03
9 SWITZERL
AND
ZURICH ZRH 344.0 340.1 355.3 91.00 91.14 91.67 2.75 2.18
10 GERMANY MUNICH MUC 100.2 110.9 123.5 59.88 61.63 61.83 1.66 1.50
11 DENMARK COPENHAGEN CPH 338.0 387.7 79.24 80.05 82.23 2.43 1.37
12 SPAIN PALMA DE
MALLORCA
PMI 19.1 21.1 24.9 74.48 73.73 74.23 0.61 0.65
13 UK MANCHESTER MAN 54.7 83.8 99.0 80.66 82.46 83.67 2.98 1.46
14 BELGIUM BRUSSELS
NATIONAL
BRU 441.3 464.0 530.7 99.22 98.79 99.24 0.77 0.74
15 GERMANY DUSSELDORF DUS 62.1 62.9 71.4 72.95 73.41 73.90 0.89 0.80
16 SWEDEN ARLANDA ARN 130.1 145.0 146.1 56.96 58.65 60.68 1.86 1.61
17 SPAIN BARCELONA BCN 74.6 86.0 85.4 38.91 39.87 41.56 3.53 3.34
18 TURKEY ATATURK IST 139.3 140.3 178.7 67.26 68.53 66.40 1.24 1.31
19 ITALY LINATE LIN 79.0 78.1 75.6 56.79 54.90 53.80 1.09 0.06
20 GREECE ATHINAI ATH 104.1 84.3 119.9 63.92 63.66 61.55 2.26 0.00
21 IRELAND DUBLIN DUB 66.6 74.2 92.0 94.07 94.11 94.32 0.52 0.95
22 AUSTRIA VIENNA INTL VIE 98.6 101.6 113.7 93.76 93.80 94.60 2.04 1.46
23 RUSSIAN
FED.
SHERMETYEVO SVO 77.8 79.3 76.74 76.07 1.73
24 GERMANY TEGEL TXL 33.4 36.3 37.1 38.67 41.24 41.37 1.03 1.25
25 GERMANY HAMBURG
F LSBUTTEL
HAM 59.6 57.3 53.8 57.76 58.20 57.59 1.11 1.19
26 FINLAND HELSINKI
VANTAA
HEL 91.3 97.2 99.2 65.33 65.16 63.63 8.70 9.36
27 SPAIN GRAN
CANARIA
LPA 37.6 40.6 43.8 66.06 66.12 67.14 3.23 2.87
28 SPAIN TENERIFE
SUR
TFS 11.1 12.0 11.6 81.37 81.97 83.22 2.26 1.88
29 FRANCE NICE-COTE
D'AZUR
NCE 26.7 26.9 27.4 36.76 36.18 39.60 1.22 0.91
30 SPAIN MALAGA AGP 7.5 7.4 8.4 72.57 71.85 71.94 0.98 1.09
31 GERMANY STUTTGART STR 31.3 35.6 34.1 60.78 65.04 64.81 1.46 2.39
32 PORTUGAL LISBON LIS 99.2 100.7 110.6 77.07 77.58 78.16 3.60 2.72




GVA 78.1 72.8 73.6 82.70 82.71 82.82 3.17 2.00
35 UNITED
KINGDOM





BHX 22.6 21.0 21.4 79.79 80.17 80.37 2.53 2.01
37 FRANCE MARSEILLE
PROVENCE
MRS 61.0 64.3 58.6 27.87 27.87 28.09 4.55 2.51
38 UNITED
KINGDOM
STANSTED STN 102.3 116.9 141.8 78.47 77.34 77.52 0.77 1.11
39 GERMANY COLOGNE
BONN
CGN 308.1 344.2 398.5 50.22 53.24 51.53 1.55 1.37
40 FRANCE SATOLAS LYS 32.5 35.0 38.2 49.09 50.12 51.27 3.19 2.54Paper presented at 39




Selected Statistics for Top 40 European Airports
Country City Airport Airport
Code Avg Pax per Pax/Combi
Movement
Avg Pax per Total
Movements
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
UK LONDON HEATHROW LHR 131.13 132.42 136.61 130.02 131.28 135.47
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
RHEIM/MAIN FRA 108.32 102.47 102.00 103.90
FRANCE PARIS CHARLES DE
GAULLE
CDG 93.63 94.73 96.46 87.16 87.98 89.24
NETH. AMSTERDAM SCHIPHOL AMS 90.80 90.00 93.83 87.22 86.38 90.34
UK LONDON GATWICK LGW 120.65 118.29 119.85 117.44 115.33 117.57
FRANCE PARIS ORLY ORY 115.91 112.25 106.43 114.52 111.53 105.69
ITALY ROME FIUMICINO FCO 105.01 100.80 97.40 101.74
SPAIN MADRID BARAJAS MAD 91.11 90.02 93.50
SWITZ. ZURICH ZURICH ZRH 73.45 72.33 75.68 73.39 72.30 75.66
GERMANY MUNICH MUNICH MUC 74.64 75.20 73.71 73.64 74.09 72.61





PMI 122.79 120.83 115.93
UK MANCHESTER MANCHESTER MAN 100.62 102.11 107.41
BELGIUM BRUSSELS BRUSSELS
NATIONAL
BRU 62.66 61.79 69.75 56.82 55.98 62.56
GERMANY DUSSELDORF DUSSELDORF DUS 91.74 89.99 92.45 90.98 89.18 92.00
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM ARLANDA ARN 64.66 64.98 63.81 62.76 62.41 61.72
SPAIN BARCELONA BARCELONA BCN 76.73 75.61 72.43
TURKEY ISTANBUL ATATURK IST 91.77 90.69 93.48
ITALY MILAN LINATE LIN 82.48 80.49 86.48 81.65 80.07 86.11
GREECE ATHENS ATHINAI ATH 86.06 84.65 79.36
IRELAND DUBLIN DUBLIN DUB 79.79 72.58 74.72 76.93
AUSTRIA VIENNA VIENNA INTL VIE 60.60 60.12 63.76 59.67 59.25 62.45
RUSSIAN
FED.
MOSCOW SHERMETYEVO SVO 75.14 81.07 73.68 79.77
GERMANY BERLIN TEGEL TXL 74.38 72.02 75.07 73.51 71.42 74.31
GERMANY HAMBURG HAMBURG-
FHLSBUTTEL
HAM 70.04 69.23 70.28 69.13 68.35 69.33
FINLAND HELSINKI HELSINKI
VANTAA
HEL 63.18 63.27 62.12
SPAIN GRAN CANARIA GRAN
CANARIA
LPA 102.59 103.47 103.47
SPAIN TENERIFE SUR TENERIFE
SUR
TFS 142.13 140.74 143.45
FRANCE NICE NICE-COTE
D'AZUR
NCE 50.97 47.44 43.15 50.12 46.67 42.46
SPAIN MALAGA MALAGA AGP 113.40 111.88 111.61
GERMANY STUTTGART STUTTGART STR 62.00 69.64 74.73 60.49 67.71 72.53
PORTUGAL LISBON LISBON LIS 94.20 90.88 89.59 92.70 89.96 88.79




GVA 63.27 60.74 62.22 62.60 59.90 60.83
UK GLASGOW GLASGOW GLA 75.76 75.48 77.63 73.85 73.92 76.38
UK BIRMINGHAM BIRMINGHAM
INTL
BHX 72.37 71.90 75.81 71.08 70.66 74.89
FRANCE MARSEILLE MARSEILLE
PROVENCE
MRS 78.15 70.52 67.99 62.96
UK LONDON STANSTED STN 69.44 71.67 73.76 59.34 62.76 64.28
GERMANY COLOGNE COLOGNE
BONN
CGN 58.12 58.97 52.92 42.56 43.48 38.98
FRANCE LYON SATOLAS LYS 64.38 64.47 58.49 58.71 58.22 52.53Paper presented at 39




Selected Statistics for Top 40 European Airports
Country City Airport Airport
Code




1995/96 1996/97 1995/97 1995/96 1996/97 1995/97 1995 1996 1997
UK LONDON HEATHROW LHR 2.91 3.76 6.78 1.92 0.54 2.48 0.84 0.86 0.83
GERMANY FRANKFURT/
MAIN
RHEIM/MAIN FRA 1.52 3.87 5.46 1.99 1.97 4.01 5.40 0.00 0.00
FRANCE PARIS CHARLES DE
GAULLE
CDG 11.88 11.25 24.47 10.84 9.68 21.57 6.91 7.13 7.48
NETH. AMSTERDAM SCHIPHOL AMS 9.62 13.58 24.51 10.70 8.61 20.22 3.94 4.02 3.73
UK LONDON GATWICK LGW 7.93 10.78 19.57 9.90 8.67 19.43 2.66 2.50 1.90
FRANCE PARIS ORLY ORY 2.67 -8.44 -5.99 5.42 -3.37 1.86 1.20 0.64 0.69
ITALY ROME FIUMICINO FCO 9.22 8.53 18.54 13.03 3.90 17.44 4.01 0.00 0.00
SPAIN MADRID BARAJAS MAD 9.52 7.98 18.27 10.84 3.97 15.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWITZ. ZURICH ZURICH ZRH 5.77 12.59 19.09 7.37 7.59 15.51 0.08 0.04 0.03
GERMANY MUNICH MUNICH MUC 5.50 14.08 20.36 4.87 16.40 22.06 1.34 1.48 1.48





PMI 4.41 7.67 12.42 6.10 12.23 19.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
UK MANCHESTER MANCHESTER MAN -2.08 8.73 6.46 -3.51 3.37 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
BELGIUM BRUSSELS BRUSSELS
NATIONAL
BRU 7.30 17.86 26.46 8.91 5.47 14.86 9.31 9.40 10.30
GERMANY DUSSELDORF DUSSELDORF DUS -4.78 7.70 2.55 -2.86 4.39 1.41 0.82 0.90 0.48
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM ARLANDA ARN 5.03 6.86 12.24 5.63 8.06 14.14 2.93 3.96 3.28
SPAIN BARCELONA BARCELONA BCN 14.56 12.14 28.46 16.25 17.07 36.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
TURKEY ISTANBUL ATATURK IST 11.86 9.59 22.59 13.19 6.32 20.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITALY MILAN LINATE LIN 16.04 13.59 31.81 18.32 5.64 24.99 1.01 0.51 0.43
GREECE ATHENS ATHINAI ATH -0.65 6.52 5.81 1.00 13.61 14.74 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRELAND DUBLIN DUBLIN DUB 13.29 13.66 28.76 10.04 10.40 21.49 9.04 0.00 0.00
AUSTRIA VIENNA VIENNA INTL VIE 6.96 6.54 13.95 7.70 1.08 8.86 1.54 1.45 2.05
RUSSIAN
FED.
MOSCOW SHERMETYEVO SVO 9.47 1.11 1.93 1.60
GERMANY BERLIN TEGEL TXL 1.23 4.27 5.56 4.20 0.21 4.43 1.16 0.83 1.01
GERMANY HAMBURG HAMBURG-
F LSBUTTEL
HAM -0.08 5.54 5.45 1.06 4.04 5.14 1.30 1.27 1.35
FINLAND HELSINKI HELSINKI
VANTAA










TFS -1.41 3.93 2.46 -0.44 1.97 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRANCE NICE NICE-COTE
D'AZUR
NCE 7.51 11.64 20.02 15.44 22.74 41.68 1.68 1.61 1.61
SPAIN MALAGA MALAGA AGP 5.40 9.28 15.19 6.84 9.55 17.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
GERMANY STUTTGART STUTTGART STR 26.30 6.06 33.96 12.82 -0.98 11.71 2.44 2.76 2.94
PORTUGAL LISBON LISBON LIS 1.60 3.60 5.26 4.69 4.97 9.89 1.60 1.01 0.90




GVA -1.44 -0.00 -1.45 3.00 -1.53 1.42 1.06 1.39 2.24





BHX 2.60 10.20 13.07 3.22 3.98 7.32 1.79 1.73 1.22
FRANCE MARSEILLE MARSEILLE
PROVENCE
MRS 5.77 1.34 7.19 9.71 9.42 20.05 9.77 0.00 0.00
UK LONDON STANSTED STN 24.10 11.54 38.43 17.32 8.91 27.78 14.55 12.42 12.85
GERMANY COLOGNE COLOGNE
BONN
CGN 10.27 1.56 11.99 7.95 13.28 22.29 26.76 26.26 26.34
FRANCE LYON SATOLAS LYS 12.06 -0.45 11.55 13.01 10.32 24.66 8.81 9.70 10.18Paper presented at 39














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Passenger Transport, 1994: Air Traffic between EU Countries (Million passengers)
Reporting Country (From:)
To: B D DK E F GR I IRL L NL P UK A FIN S EU15
 B 0.91 0.26 1.69 0.91 0.48 0.86 0.13 0.04 0.26 0.33 1.75 0.16 0.10 0.22 8.10
 D 0.91 1.01 12.50 3.12 4.83 3.08 0.36 0.15 1.59 1.38 6.16 1.68 0.47 0.60 37.84
DK 0.23 0.99 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.38 0.02 0.02 0.34 0.09 1.18 0.16 0.30 1.63 6.98
 E 1.70 12.61 0.74 2.97 0.22 2.74 0.51 0.22 1.94 0.69 17.31 0.63 0.40 1.00 43.68
 F 0.94 3.34 0.54 3.27 1.10 3.65 0.44 0.08 1.24 1.20 7.45 0.46 0.19 0.43 24.33
 GR 0.47 5.28 0.59 0.19 1.04 1.26 0.07 0.04 1.01 0.02 4.92 0.75 0.23 0.74 16.61
  I 0.83 3.02 0.37 2.72 3.39 1.30 0.14 0.05 0.90 0.35 4.03 0.35 0.08 0.16 17.69
 IRL 0.11 0.36 0.08 0.52 0.44 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.11 4.98 0.03 0.00 0.01 7.02
 L 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92
 NL 0.31 1.60 0.39 1.96 1.16 1.03 0.94 0.15 0.04 0.53 4.03 0.31 0.14 0.48 13.07
 P 0.31 1.26 0.05 0.63 1.16 0.03 0.38 0.11 0.06 0.53 2.45 0.06 0.03 0.09 7.16
 UK 1.88 6.26 1.28 17.65 7.26 4.96 4.19 5.12 0.16 4.01 2.69 1.14 0.42 1.12 58.14
 A 0.16 1.71 0.17 0.64 0.44 0.77 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.31 0.08 1.14 0.05 0.13 6.01
 FIN 0.10 0.47 0.30 0.40 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.42 0.05 0.73 3.14
S 0.22 0.51 1.26 0.78 0.34 0.42 1.09 0.06 0.00 0.43 0.08 0.64 0.10 0.73 6.66
Note: The 20 most important flows are highlighted with bold typeface.
Source: Eurostat (1997) EU Transport Statistics in Figures, 2
nd Edition, Table 5.5Paper presented at 39
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2.3 Options for improving management and organisation of existing
Capacity
2.3.1. Pricing or Charging Policies
2.3.1.1. Optimal Pricing for Regulated Monopoly and public utilities:
The basic economic principles of marginal cost pricing suggest that welfare is maximised where prices
are set equal to long run marginal cost. As with economies of scale, under economies of scope, price
will be below average costs with this marginal cost pricing prescription. As Kahn (1988) points out, the
traditional legal criteria of proper public utility rates have always borne a strong resemblance to the
criteria of the competitive market in long run equilibrium. The principal benchmark for ‘just and
reasonable’ rate levels has been the cost of producing including the necessary return on capital. The
rule that individual rates not be unduly discriminatory has similarly been defined in terms of the
respective costs of the various services. However, it is short run marginal cost to which price should
be equated because it is the short run marginal cost which reflects the social opportunity cost of
providing the additional unit that buyers are at any time trying to decide to buy. Marginal costs look to
the future not the past since it is only future costs that can be saved if production is not undertaken. In
the presence of competition, it is long run and not short run costs, which should set the floor. If capital
costs are to be included in price, then it should be clear that those capital costs are those that will
have to be covered over time in the future if service is to continue to be rendered.
The issue then arises as to whether all users should pay the price, which includes the capacity costs.
Kahn argues that the off-peak users should not pay these costs since they do not impose these costs
on society once their demand is sufficiently slight and inelastic that even at a zero cost, no congestion
occurs at the time when they use the facility. The customers impose the necessity for expansion at the
peak hours. If the same type of capacity serves all users, capacity costs should be levied only on
utilisation at the peak. This peak responsibility pricing is not discriminatory between peak and off-peak
users (that (discrimination) implies that the price differences are not based on cost differences), rather
it reflects the fact that there is a genuine increase in the costs of supplying users at the peak
compared with the off-peak. The proposal then is to reflect the cost difference in respective prices.
When infrastructure capacity or plant is built far in advance of total need (because for example of
economies of scale), charging depreciation in equal instalments imposes a disproportionately heavy
burden on customers in earlier years, when much of the capacity lies idle. This idle capacity is of
benefit to future not present customers. Economic efficiency suggests concentrating capital charges in
the later years.
Finally, in situations of economies of scale or scope, where price set equal to marginal cost will yield a
loss, Ramsey prices eliminate the deficit while minimising the loss in welfare that results. Ramsey
prices maximise social welfare but also require revenues to cover costs: the resulting prices achieve
as great a level of social welfare as possible in the presence of realities that prevent the use of
marginal cost prices.
The options for dealing with this infrastructural constraint are
• Expand capacity at existing airports
• Build new airports
• Utilise demand management techniques to better allocate capacity
Demand management techniques can be either administrative, where an executive body make
decisions or involve pricing techniques, whereby operators make choices on the basis of their
willingness to pay. Table 8 summarises the literature on runway congestion management techniques,
under these two headings and presents the advantages and disadvantages associated with both sets
of approaches.Paper presented at 39
th Congress of European Regional Science Association, August 24-27, 1999, University College Dublin,
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Table 8: Advantages and Disadvantages of Approaches to Runway Congestion Management









￿ Simple method; attractive to airport
authorities
Bans & quotas:
￿ Prompt & direct means
￿ Can meet variety of objectives
(efficiency; social; environmental;
regional development)
￿ Effective at controlling peak period
traffic
￿ May not result in economically efficient
allocation
￿ Mix of categories may not be efficient or
reasonable







￿ Encourage certainty in airline route
planning
￿ Encourages continuity of scheduled
service
￿ May be anti-competitive, biasing slots
towards incumbents
￿ Reduces contestability of industry
￿ May make inefficient allocations






￿ Unbiased allocation mechanism
￿ May promote competition by
allocation to new entrants
￿ Difficult to build schedule on random
allocation
￿ May not be sufficient to develop network
schedules
￿ May not be efficient allocation






￿ Straight forward to administer
￿ Access open to all potential operators
based on willingness to pay
￿ Helps remove or reorient low value
operators to uncongested  facilities -
non-discriminatory
￿ Revenue raised may be used for
expansion
￿ May still require administrative strategy
during peak period
￿ Determination of appropriate MSC prices
is impossible - prices determined based on
demand suppression effect
￿ Charges continually vary upwards based
on increasing demand
￿ Low cross-elasticity of demand between
peak and off-peak: may be difficult to
spread the peak period




￿ If prices is the sole means of
allocation, will establish true market
value of slots
￿ Increase contestability of industry  -
open to all operators
￿ Bidders may lack adequate information
on value of slots
￿ Auction format may significantly
influence success or failure of process
￿ Long term implications of selling access
rights to airport users need to be fully
appreciated
Sources: BTCE (1996); Hamzawi (1992); Doganis (1992); Swoveland (1980); Morrison (1987); Fawcett and Fawcett (1988);
Brander, Cook and Rowcroft (1989); Mills (1990); Reed (1992); CAA UK (1993); Fisher (1989); Kearney and Favotto( 1993);
Balinski and Sand (1985).
2.4. Issues in expanding capacity
In the economics literature on the relationship between marginal cost pricing and investment,  Vickrey
(1971)  suggested a pattern of pricing over time when investment is lumpy. This pattern is illustrated in
Figure 5b. In the first part of the figure (a), demand is increasing over time.  When demand grows
from  D1 to D2 , in the short run, the marginal cost price rises from P1 to P2. As new capacity is added,
and demand continues to grow, prices fall to P3. The increase in price prior to the expansion of
capacity rations the capacity at its initial supply level. The pattern continues over time as illustrated,
with short-term increases in price when each successive level of capacity is reached. With additional
capacity being added the price reduces to the level of the marginal cost. Vickrey’s pricing pattern is
somewhat different: as demand grows, price should rise for a period before the new capacity is
available. The increase in price should be sufficient to curtail demand to the existing level of capacity.
When the new capacity comes on stream, the price should drop sharply to the point where the new
capacity is fully utilised. Once again the price should increase as demand grows so as to keep
consumption within the limits of the available capacity.Paper presented at 39
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Issues arise regarding who should pay the higher short run charges as demand increases and also
which costs are fixed and which are variable in this scenario. Some of these issues were mentioned in
the previous subsection. Small, Winston and Evans (1989) provide a detailed analysis of the
application of such a pricing and investment policy to the management of road infrastructure, given
different categories of road users, differing levels of deterioration in existing pavements, and differing
levels of investment requirements for new and existing facilities. They also suggest a simplified policy
application, given the likely public and government reaction to constantly changing prices.
Small et al suggest two sets of charges. The first are road wear charges and the second congestion
charges. The road wear charges suggested would encourage firms to use less damaging vehicles and
use roads  most suited to heavy trucks. The charges would ideally be applied to all categories of
heavy vehicle whether publicly or privately owned. The proposed congestion charges would replace
replace traffic management measures and should be determined on the basis of their impact on
specific sections as well as on competing sections.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Marginal Cost Pricing With Shifting Capacity And Increasing Demand
Pattern of prices over 
time under the marginal 
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In relating these discussions to airports, airport charges and investment in infrastructure, we highlight
the difficulties associated with implementing such a pricing and investment policy in airport facility
management and point to several bottlenecks or constraints, which need further study and analysis.
For airports, which have the facility to expand capacity, the funding for this capacity and planning
regulation are the key issues, which need to be addressed. The decision regarding the expansion of
capacity is a public decision involving planners, residents and other interested groups. This process
has become increasingly more involved as environmental regulations particularly have become a far
more prominent issue in the public consultation process. The extent to which hearings and inquiries
may delay, slow down or halt the process of expansion needs to be addressed from a policy point of
view since the uncertainty about the form of the ultimate decision has significant cost and route
planning implications for airport users.
The timing of investment decisions should be closely linked with an airport’s pricing policy. The greater
the degree of uncertainty in the timing of new capacity, the more difficult will be an appropriate pricing
and management policy. The EU’s framework for an airport charging policy  (CEC, 1995) was slow to
be negotiated and in draft form demanded transparency and non-discrimination in the application of
charges to operators. The directive also allows for willingness-to-pay and Ramsey pricing
mechanisms, which by their nature are discriminatory. Further, the directive permits the charges to be
related to the airports overall costs or indeed to a regional system of airports’ overall costs (these and
other issues are discussed in detail in Reynolds-Feighan and Feighan (1997)). Unfortunately this
‘bundling’ of services creates problems when trying to relate charges for particular services to their
costs: the pricing signals become obscured.
The airline industry in some parts of Europe has experienced the growth in new products initiated by
low cost scheduled operators, who have been to the fore in driving change in the regions in which they
operate. These low cost carriers have played and will play an important role in bringing about changes
to the European air transport sector. The needs of these carriers must be considered by policy makers
when planning infrastructure developments. The low cost carriers have tended to focus their
operations on under-utilised secondary airports close to the key European metropolitan areas (for
example, Ryanair the Irish carrier have focused its services around Paris-Beauvais, Brussels –
Charleroi and London – Stansted and Luton airports). This will clearly impact on the interoperability of
the air transport system.
It is important from a policy perspective to examine the management and traffic distribution in Europe
from a system perspective and deal with issues of strategic infrastructure planning from this ‘network’
point of view. For airports which do not have the ability to expand, because of land constraints or
planning regulations, the issue of long term rationing of their fixed capacity and the diversion of traffics
needs to be addressed from this viewpoint. The issue of re-distributing traffic is contentious but
critically linked to the role and level of investment funding for airports. The issue will need to be
addressed in order to enable changes in the economic regulation of airlines to have their full effect.
We are suggesting on one hand that individual services be costed as precisely as possible, but that
these specific items be viewed as part of a network or system of facilities. For example, in allocating
European airport runway slots, consideration would need to be given to pavement damage and
congestion effects of particular categories of users at individual facilities. These charges then have to
be considered in the context of their impacts on other airports in the network, and the possibilities for
expansion.
There are legal constraints associated with introducing congestion taxes and then using the revenues
to provide capacity elsewhere in the system (because it may not be possible to expand capacity at an
existing congested facility).  Analysis of traffic flow effects and the possible future air carrier network
configurations will need to be explored in the theoretical literature so that the likely effects on traffic
patterns and carrier networks may be analysed.Paper presented at 39
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2.5.  Implications for interoperability
It is clear from the data presented in earlier sections that while Europe may have sufficient airport
infrastructure overall, that capacity is often in the wrong place, with congestion levels growing at the
key hub centres. The expansion of capacity is not a straight forward process even if there is land
available for further development at existing airports. Environmental regulations particularly and issues
related to funding of investment can have a significant impact on the timing and final outcome in the
expansion of infrastructure.  Air transport has always been a component in multi-modal journeys for
passengers and freight. Passengers need to get to and from airports as does freight so the issue of
airport access is an integral part of airport planning and development.
The main factor that may prevent enhancement of the interoperability of the aviation sector is once
again the infrastructure constraints and associated delays at airports.  Most of the large airports in
Europe now have or have planned substantial rail stations at the airports, with direct links to regional
and metropolitan centres. Several airports have sought to integrate high speed rail interchanges at the
airports. These kinds of developments will help to boost air traffic growth, which is forecast to continue
growing at rates of 5-6% for passenger and freight services for the next 15 years.
One option is the development of  secondary airports in Europe. We have already discussed
developments at this category of airport by low cost operators. The larger airports will increasingly
substitute long haul services for short haul services, since this will allow for increases in passenger
numbers without an accompanying increase in movements. The problem is that all airports rely on the
combination of locally originating and transfer passengers to support their air services. So the
feasibility of separating out point-to-point traffic and concentrating it at secondary airports is
questionable.
The evidence from the US suggests that deregulation allowed for significant growth in air traffic and
carriers initially serviced the increased demand through interactive multiple hub network systems.
Point-to-point operators at a certain stage can then enter certain markets where it is possible because
of the increased volume to offer direct service. The viability of secondary airports in Europe will
depend on the extent of traffic growth, the extent of competition from other surface transport modes
and the characteristics of the traffic, particularly the extent of high yield business traffic. These airports
will need to offer a certain threshold level of service on routes served since passengers will choose
more frequent service (at primary airports) over less frequent service.
The planning and funding of infrastructure for Europe’s network of airports, which are increasingly
becoming multi-modal hubs, requires careful collection and collation of data monitoring traffic
characteristics and pricing information. Data for the EU air transport sector is not routinely made
avaiable and is not consistent in what it records. In planning for the enhancement of each mode of
transport in order to improve its interoperability, the collection of detailed accurate and comprehensive
information on the sector must be prioritised.
3  Conclusions
This paper has focused on the capacity of the European air transport sector and the measurement  of
factors influencing its supply of services. In the first section of the paper, it was argued that the airport
is in fact a multi-service network of activities, many of which are not specifically related to aeronautical
uses. This has implications for the pricing or costing of the aeronautical activities, since the issue of
cross-subsidisation or cross-crediting of revenues is an important one in Europe. We argued that
airport infrastructure services, such as runway use, passenger terminal use etc, should be costed
separately in order to allow the pricing mechanism to correctly signal  when expansion or rationing is
required.
The next section of the paper dealt with the definition and measurement of airport capacity. ‘Capacity’
refers to the ability of a component in the airport system to handle aircraft and is usually expressed in
terms of operations per hour (arrivals or departures).  This hourly capacity is the maximum number of
operations that can be handled in a one-hour period under specific operating conditions, in particular,Paper presented at 39
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ceiling and visibility, air traffic control, the aircraft mix and the nature of operations. Capacity is
therefore a measure of supply. Each of these factors was examined in turn in a general manner.
The issue of airport delays was then focused and comprehensive data were presented illustrating the
current distribution of traffic in ‘greater Europe’ and the causes and levels of delay at the busier
airports.  It was shown that there were relatively high levels of delay in Europe during the late 1980s,
with improvements up until 1994. There has been a gradual rise in delays at departure airports since
then. In 1996, air traffic flow management over Europe was centralised within Eurocontrol, which the
AEA report resulted in a wider distribution of delay. This helped to alleviate delays in the worst
affected sectors but introduced delays in sectors, which had previously operated, with minimal delay.
Data from EUROCONTROL’s Centre for delay analysis became available for the first time in 1998 for
the year 1997. These data were analysed in conjunction with the Airport Council International’s traffic
data in order to identify trends in the pattern of delays and the most penalised airports. It was
concluded that traffic levels have the greatest association with overall delay (i.e. departure plus arrival
delays). There is no statistical association between traffic growth rates and average delay per
movement. The simple correlation between total delay and average passenger/movement is 0.37. So
the congested airports which experience the greatest delays can allow increases in their passenger
throughput by encouraging the utilisation of larger aircraft.
The options available to policy makers to improve the management and organisation of existing
capacity were set out and critically discussed in the next section. Tables giving the advantages and
disadvantages of different demand management policies and procedures were presented, thus
summarising the extensive literature in this area. The general thrust of this paper  has been to argue
for better use of market-based management and investment strategies. These was elaborated in
Section 2.4, where several issues arising in relation to the expansion of capacity were highlighted. It
was suggested that an airport system-wide approach to traffic management and investment would
need to be considered as several of Europe’s larger and more congested airports would not be in a
position to expand capacity and the appropriate pricing would seek to reallocate certain traffics. At the
same time it was argued that it was important to cost or price specific services independently, since
this would allow the pricing mechanism to signal optimal timing and location of new capacity.
In the final section of the paper, the implications of these approaches and problems for interoperability
were sketched out. The key point made was that greater integration of different transport modes while
enhancing users accessibility and route choice, would put further pressure on Europe’s airport
infrastructure. The section concluded that data collection and analysis needs to be prioritised in order
for policy makers and airport managers to better manage the air transport component of Europe’s
transport networks.Paper presented at 39
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